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sum of $3,000 in cash. Appellant filed a protest against such
proposed exchange, on the ground that the estate had not been
distributed. However, the said petition was granted on the
ground that the exchange of the respective properties was for
the best interests of the ,estate. The order recited that notice
of hearing has been duly given and that evidence both oral
and documentary had been introduced. The court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition as presented, and there is
no showing that the order was void on its face. No appeal
from such order was filed until September 27, 1937. The
order had become final long prior to the last-mentioned date,
and the present attack comes too late to be of any avail to
appellant.
[6] It therefore follows that appellant's present objections
to the two orders herein attacked may not be successfully
urged on this appeal which was taken from the decree settling
the final accounts of Wm. G. Richards' successor. To entertain those objections at this time would be to put the starq.p of
approval on an action which amounts to no more than a collateral attack on the said two orders.
From the foregoing it follows that the decree settling accounts and ordering distribution should be, and it hereby is,
affirmed.

ESTATE OF TODD.

271

share of the estate by intestate succession the same as if no
will had been made regardless of whether the testator's child
dies before or after the making of the will, assuming that the
testator's child dies before the testator. (Estate of Childs,
21 Cal. App. (2d) 103, 68 Pac. (2d) 306, is disapproved.)
[2] Statutes-Construction and Interpretation-Aids to Construction-Change of Language.-Ordinarily any essential change
in the phraseology of a statute indicates an intention on the
part of the legislature to change its meaning, rather than to
interpret it.
(3] WillS-Failed Gifts and Undisposed of Property-Lapsing and
Substitution-Substitutional Provisions.-Where a will devises
an estate to the testator's wife and his son, or the survivor
of them, the intention is to substitute the wife as sole legatee
in the event of the death of the Son.
(4] ld.-Disinheritance-Succession by Pretermitted Issue-Per_
sons to Whom Rule Applies-Child of Deceased Devisee or
Legatee as not Within RUle.-If the child of a deceased devisee or legatee is entitled to succeed to his parent's share
under Prob. Code, § 92, he is not entitled to claim a share as
a pretermitted heir under Prob. Code, § 90.
~

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of
Sonoma Oounty decreeing final distribution of an estate.
Hilliard Oomstock, JUdge. Reversed with directions.
Henry E. Monroe, Julia M. Easley and Geary & Geary and
C. J. Tauzer for Appellant.

[Sac. No. 5315.

In Bank.-February 3, 1941.]

In the Matter of the Estate of RUSH B. TODD, Deceased.
RIDGEWAY ADDISON TODD, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. INEZ TODD, Respondent.
[1] Wills-Disinheritance-Succession by Pretermitted Issue-

Persons to Whom Rule Applies-Grandchildren.-By Probate
Code, section 90, providing for succession by child or the issue
of a deceased .child omitted from a will, "whether born before or after the making of the will or before or after the
death of the testator", etc., if the issue of a testator's child
is not provided for by the will, such issue shall succeed to a
1. See 26 Cal. Jur. 918.
McK. Dig. References: 1, 4. Wills, § 313; 2. Statutes, § 181;
3. Wills, § 343.

Grove J. Fink and Garton D. Keyston for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-This is an appeal from a decree of final distribution, which distributed the entire estate of Rush B.
Todd, deceased, to his surviving wife, Inez Todd, one of respondents herein. The whole of said estate was decedent's
separate property. The appellant is Ridgeway Addison Todd,
a minor, the grandson of the decedent and being the son of
Addison Todd, the son of decedent. Addison Todd died prior
to the death of decedent. The other respondent is the executor of the estate.
The facts are undisputed. The decedent made his will
on February 17, 1925, in which it was provided in part:
"Paragraph Third: I hereby declare that I am married, that
2.

"

•

See 23 Cal Jur. 722; 25 R. C. L. 1018.
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my wife's name is Inez Todd, and that I have one child living, to-wit, a son, Addison Todd. Paragraph Fifth: I hereby
give, devise and bequeath all of my estate, . . . equally, share
and share alike, to my said wife, Inez Todd, and my said
son, .Addison Todd, or to the survivor of them." No mention of appellant, decedent's grandson, was made in the will,
he was not provided for by settlement or advancement; and it
does not appear· from the will that the omission was intentional.
Appellant, grandson of decedent, was born on May 7, 1931.
Addison Todd, decedent's son, died on September 28, 1935,
and left appellant surviving him as his sole issue. Decedent
died on May 16, 1936. The decree of distribution distributed
the decedent's entire estate to Inez Todd, his surviving wife.
Appellant urges as grounds for reversal of the decree that
appellant shOUld take one-half of the estate by virtue of section 90 of the Probate Code, and that even if he cannot prevail on that basis he is entitled to one-half the estate by reason
of the death of his father, one of the legatees in the will, prior
to decedent's death, pursuant to section 92 of the Probate
Code.
It is clear that if appellant comes within the terms of section 90 of the Probate Code, he is entitled to disregard the
will and receive the portion of the estate allowed to him under
the laws of intestate succession, which in the instant case is
one-half of decedent's property inasmuch as it was separate
property and decedent's wife survived him. (Prob. Code,
secs. 90 and 221.)
Prior to the adoption of section 90 of the Probate Code
in 1931, the law concerning pretermitted heirs was embodied
in sections 1306, 1307, 1308 and 1309 of the Civil Code. Section 1306 provided for inheritance by a child born after the
will and provided in part: "Whenever a testator has a child
born after the making of his will, either in his lifetime or
after his death, and dies leaving such child unprovided for by
any settlement, and neither provided for nor in any way
mentioned in his will, the child succeeds to the same portion
of the testator's . . . property that he would have succeeded
to if the testator had died intestate." Section 1308 related
to the sources from which a pretermitted heir's share should
come. This is now stated in section 91 of the Probate Code.
Section 1309 provided that the pretermitted heir take no share

~
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if he had an equal share by advancement. This is now embraced in section 90 of the Probate Code. The portion of
section 1307 which is here particularly pertinent read: "When
any testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child, unless it appears that such omiss~on was intentional, such child, or the
issue of such child, has the same share in the estate of the
testator as if he had died intestate, and succeeds thereto as
provided in the preceding section (1306). . . . " Section
1307 was first construed in In re Barter, 86 Cal. 441 [25 Pac.
15], and it was there held that the failure of the testator to
provide for his grandchild did not make such grandchild a
pretermitted heir, where the grandchild's mother was alive
at the time the will was made but died prior to the death of
the testator. The decision was properly based on the ground
that section 1307 made pretermitted heirs of only those grandchildren who were the issue of a child of the testator dead at
the time the will was made. With section 1307 remaining
unchanged, the Barter case was considered favorably in Estat·e
of Ross, 140 Cal. 282 [73 Pac. 976], and Estate of Matthews,
176 Cal. 576 [169 Pac. 233], although the exact question involved in the Barter case was not in issue in either of those
cases.
[1] However, in 1931, sections 1306, 1307, 1308 and 1309
of the Civil Code were repealed and section 90 of the Probate
Code was adopted and contains additional clauses radically
changing those sections in certain respects. Section 90, the
law controlling in the instant case, provides in part: "When
a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children,
or for the issue of any deceased child, whether born before
or after the rnaking of the will or before or after the death
of the testator, . . . unless it appears from the will that such
omission was intentional, such child or such issue succeeds
to the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had
died intestate." The italicized portions are the clauses which
did not appear in sections 1306 or 1307 of the Civil Code. We
believe it is quite obvious that the legislature intended to
change the law and the rule announced in the Barter case
to provide that if the issue of a testator's child is not provided for by the will, such issue shall succeed to a share of
the est;1te by intestate succession the same as if no will had
been made regardless of whether the testator's child dies be~

=~.~.~-~.------~,--.~,,-~----~~->
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fore or after the will is made, and whether the issue of the
child is born before or after the making of the will, assuming,
of course, the testator's child dies before the testator. To
determine that no such change was accomplished as contended
by respondents, and held by the trial court would be to render
ineffective and practically meaningless the words added by
the adoption of section 90. To assume that the change accomplished was limited to grandchildren born after the will
was executed but whose parent was dead when the will was
made, would be a strained and unreasonable construction.
At the best it would make the added words fit only extremely
rare instances and would be manifestly unjust as it' would
confer a right as a pretermitted heir on the child of a testator's son but deny that right to a child of the testator's
daughter. This limited application of the added words as
interpreted in Estate of Ohilds, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 103 [68
Pac. (2d) 306], is relied upon by respondents in support of
the holding of the trial court. This holding is contrary to
the views above expressed. In Estate of Ohilds, supra, it is
stated, at page 105, that the only effect of the added words
is: "These words might serve to give protection to a grandchild born after the execution of the will whose parent was!
dead at the time of its execution." Manifestly, such a child .
would have'received protection even under section 1307 of the
Civil Code. Therefore the Ilrdded words would be meaningless.
But assuming such protection did not exist prior to the adoption of section 90 and that the added words gave only such
protection, then that protection could never be enjoyed by
the issue of a daughter of the testator because if such issue
were born after the death of the testator the daughter could
riot have predeceased the testator, whereas the issue of a
testator's son would be protected, but even such issue to come
within the protected class would be limited to those born not
later than the normal period of gestation after a time just
prior to the testator's death, assuming the son died just prior
to, such death. We cannot believe that the legislature intended to give such a limited effect or make such a discrimination by the added words which is patently unreasonable and unjust. To countenance such a construction would violate the well
settled rules of statutory construction. [2] " Ordinarily, it
would seem that any essential change in the phraseology of a
statutory provision would indicate an intention on the part of

Feb. 1941.J
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the legislature to change the meaning of such provision rather
than interpret it." (Young v. Three for One Oil Royalties,
1 Cal. (2d) 639, 646 [36 Pac. (2d) 1065J.) Section 3542
of the Civil Code provides: "Interpretation must be reasonable." It is said in 23 Cal. Jur. 722, 723: " 'Interpretation must be reasonable.' The code so provides. And it has
been decided, not only that the language of a statute must
be given a reasonable interpretation, but that every statute
as a whole must be so construed, and thus, when opportunity
arises, made compatible with common sense and the dictates of
justice. In other words, it is the duty of courts not to be
ingenious to find ambiguities in statutes because of extraneous
matters, but to interpret them in such a manner that they
may be free from ambiguity, and to give, if possible, a construction which not only renders them constitutional, but
which is consistent with sound sense and wise policy, with a
view to promoting justice."
For the foregoing reasons, that part of the decision in
Estate of Ohilds, s~tpra, apparently holding that the protection to pretermitted heirs does not extend to a grandchild
where the testator's child did not die until after the execution
of the will, is expressly disapproved.
Respondents contend that because section 1306 of the Civil
Code did contain the words "Whenever a testator has a child
born after the making of his will, either in his lifetime or
after his death" the clauses above mentioned appearing in
section 90 of the Probate Code were not in fact added. The
obvious answer to that proposition is that whereas section 1306
was concerned solely with the protection of an after-born
child, that is, a child born after a will is executed, section 90
of the Probate Code provides for not only after-born children,
but also the protection of the issue of such children.
[3] Appellant insists that if the above-mentioned proposition is determined adversely to him, he is nevertheless entitled to half the estate under section 92 of the Probate Code,
in his capacity as successor of his deceased father who was a
legatee under the will. The will devises the estate to respondent, Inez Todd and the decedent's son, or the survivor
of them.
In our opinion it was the testator's intention to substitute
respondent Inez Todd as sole legatee under his will in the
event 9f the death of his son, Addison Todd. This would

I,
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preclude appellant from taking any portion of the estate
under section 92 of the Probate Code. [4] However, if appellant could under the terms of the will have succeeded to the
share of the estate devised or bequeathed to his father under
the provisions of said section 92, he would be barred from
sharing in the estate as a pretermitted heir under the provisions of section 90 of said code.
The decree of distribution is reversed with direction to
.the court below to enter a decree in accordance with the
views herein expressed.
Shenk, J., Peters, J., pro tem., Ward, J., pro tem., and Gibson, C. J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.-I concur.
Decedent, Rush Todd, disposed of his estate by will as
follows: "I hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my estate, ... equally, share and share alike, to my said wife
Inez Todd, and my said son, Addison Todd, or to the survivor of them." In 1931, more than six years after the making of this will, Ridgeway Todd, son of Addison Todd and
grandson of the testator, was born. No provision was made
for him in the will. Addison Todd died in 1935 leaving his
father and his son surviving him. Rush Todd, the testator,
died in 1936. The decree of distribution gave the entire estate
to Inez Todd, his surviving wife. Ridgeway Todd has appealed from this decree of distribution contending that (1) by
virtue of Probate Code, section 90, he is a pretermitted heir
and therefore entitled to one-half the estate as his intestate
share and (2) Probate Code, section 92, entitles him to succeed to his father's share of the estate under the will.
Section 90 of the Probate Code provides: "When a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children,
or for the issue of any deceased child, whether born before
or after the making of the will or before or after the death
of the testator, and such child or issue are unprovided for by
any settlement, and have not had an equal proportion of the
testator's property bestowed on them by way of advancement,
unless it appears from the will that such omission was intentional, such child or such issue succeeds to the same share
in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate."
Section 92 of the Probate Code provides: "If a devisee or
legatee dies during the lifetime of the testator, the testamen-

-l'
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tary disposition to him fails unless an intention appears to
substitute another in his place j except that when any estate
is devised or bequeathed to any kindred of the testator, and
the devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving lineal
descendants, or is dead at the time the will is executed, but
leaves lineal descendants surviving the testator, such descendants take the estate so given by the will in the same
manner as the devisee or legatee would have done had he
survived the testator."
Section 90 cannot be properly interpreted without taking
into account the effect of section 92. In the ordinary situation where a testator is predeceased by his child who leaves
a surviving child, the grandchild will succeed to his parent's
share under the will by virtue of section 92. If the grandchild has received no express mention in the will may he also
be regarded as a pretermitted heir under section 90 with the
right to claim his intestate share of the estate in addition to
that portion which he takes by virtue of section 92 Y The
majority opinion states that he may not but gives no reason
for reaching that conclusion.
A grandchild who will take his predeceased parent's share
under a will by virtue of section 92 cannot be a pretermitted
heir under section 90. When a testator provides for his child
by will with no alternate disposition in the event that the
child predeceases him, he has by law also provided for any
issue of the child, since the issue will take in the place of
the parent under section 92. The testator has not, therefore,
omitted to provide for the issue of any deceased child within
the meaning of secti()n 90. He has provided for such issue
by operation of law j if the testator's child predeceases him,
the grandchild will succeed to his parent's share under section
92 and hence cannot be a pretermitted heir under section 90.
Thus, suppose a testator provides among other bequests one
of $10,000 for his son but makes no mention of a grandson.
Suppose further that the son predeceases the testator and
that the grandson's intestate share under section 90 would
be $100,000. The grandson by virtue of section 92 will take
only the $10,000 in place of his father, and not the $100,000
under section 90.
In the present case the question of whether or not the grandson, Ridgeway Todd, is a pretermitted heir under section 90,
turns upon the determination of whether or not he succeeds

"
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to his parent's share under section 92. The import of section
92 is that if a testator makes a testamentary disposition in
favor of his child which fails by virtue of the child 's pre~
deceasing the testator, no substitute legatee having been
named, the issue of such child will take in place of his parent.
If, however, the testator has provided that the property should
go to an alternate legatee in such a situation, then such alternate will take the property by virtue of the terms of the
will and, there being no lapse of the legacy, the issue of the
predeceased child will be able to claim nothing under section
92.
In the present case the testator provided that his estate
should go to his wife and his son, or to the survivor. Upon
the death of the son therefore the right to receive the entire
estate passed to the wife under the terms of the will and
'. the grandson, Ridgeway Todd, cannot claim an interest in the
.estate under section 92.
The problem remains as to whether he is a pretermitted
·heir under section 90. If the grandchild of a testator is to
take as a pretermitted heir under section 90, the grandchild's
parent must have predeceased the testator. It is respondent's
•contention, however, that the grandchild can only take as a
pretermitted heir if his parent was dead at the time the will
was made; that if the parent was alive at the time the will
was made, the testator's duty was to provide only for his
then living child, and that if such child subsequently pre,deceases the testator, a surviving grandchild is not a prei termitted heir within the meaning of section 90.
In re Barter,
86 Cal. 441 [25 Pac. 15], construing Civil Code, section 1307,
. now replaced- by section 90, held that a grandchild was not
rendered pretermitted by the testator's failure to provide for
him when his parent was alive at the time the will was made
·.even though the parent predeceased the testator. Section
1307 then provided: "When any testator omits to provide
in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of any
deceased child, unless it appears that such omission was intentional, such child, or the issue of such child, has the same
,share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate
... " Following the repeal of sections 1306, 1307, 1308 and
1309 of the Civil Code in 1931, however, section 90 of the
Probate Code was adopted and the following italicized clause
·wasadded: "When a testator omits to provide in his will for

~
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any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child,
whether born before or after the making of the will or before or after the death of the testator . . . unless it appears
from the will that such omission was intentional, such child
or issue succeeds to the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate." Despite its ambiguity,
the most reasonable construction to be placed upon this added
clause is that the legislature thereby intended to change the
rule of the Barter case under former section 1307 and to provide that a grandchild could be pretermitted even though his
parent, who subsequently predeceased the testator, was alive
at the time of the making of the will. Unless the added,
clause is so construed it must either be disregarded entirely
with respect to grandchildren or limited to situations where
the testator's son has died before the making of the will but
the son's wife has given birth to a child thereafter. (Estate
of Ohilds, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 103 [68 Pac. (2d) 306].) Since
such a grandchild would have been protected under the old
section 1307, it is more reasonable to hold that in permitting
'the issue of a predeceased child, born before or after the
making of the will, to be regarded as pretermitted, the legislature intended to include any child born at any time after the
making of the will even though his parent was alive when
the will was made. This view is reinforced by the reference
in the clause to issue born before or after the death of the
testator, which, with respect to grandchildren, would' seem
designed to cover the situation where a testator's son has
predeceased the testator after the making of the will but the
son's wife has given birth to a child after the testator's death.
The only other possible interpretation with respect to grandchildren would limit the application of this part of the clause
to the unusual situation in which the testator's son dies, the
testator makes his will, the testato1' dies, and the son's wife
gives birth to a child, all in the order given, within a period
of nine months.
In this light Ridgeway Todd must be conSidered a pretermitted heir under the provisions of Probate Code, section 90,
and he is therefore entitled to one-half of his srandfather's
estate as his intestate share. (Prob. Code, sec. 221.)
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 3, 194L
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